%0 Unpublished work %T Profession and deception: Experimental evidence on lying behavior among business and medical students %+ Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé (LIRAES - EA 4470) %+ ESSEC Business School %+ Théorie économique, modélisation et applications (THEMA) %A Besancenot, Damien %A Vranceanu, Radu %Z ESSEC Working paper. Document de Recherche ESSEC / Centre de recherche de l’ESSEC. ISSN : 1291-9616. WP 2006 %8 2020-09 %D 2020 %R 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.47 %K Lies %K Deception %K Communication %K Medicine %K Business administration %K Survey data %Z Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administrationPreprints, Working Papers, ... %X This paper reports data from a sender-receiver experiment that compares lying behavior between two groups of students, one in business administration and the other in medicine. We use a modified version of the sender-receiver deception game introduced by Erat and Gneezy (2012) to collect data on 393 subjects. The results show that both groups of students respond to incentives as expected: the frequency of lying is higher, the higher the benefit for the sender, and the lower the loss for the receiver is. For given payoffs, there is little difference between the two groups in the domain of white lies; however, business students resort to selfish lies more frequently than do medical students. Furthermore, the analysis does not confirm differences in altruism between the two groups. %G English %2 https://essec.hal.science/hal-02937998/document %2 https://essec.hal.science/hal-02937998/file/WP%202006.pdf %L hal-02937998 %U https://essec.hal.science/hal-02937998 %~ SHS %~ ESSEC %~ CNRS %~ UNIV-CERGY %~ ESSEC-WP %~ UNIV-PARIS %~ UNIVERSITE-PARIS %~ UP-SOCIETES-HUMANITES %~ TEST-HALCNRS %~ THEMA-UMR8184 %~ CY-TECH-SM %~ LIRAES