Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? * - ESSEC Working Papers Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2022

Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? *

Résumé

Pay-TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to be welfare maximizing. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on the final allocation but lead to profit redistribution along the value chain.
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Dates et versions

halshs-03714970 , version 1 (06-07-2022)
halshs-03714970 , version 2 (19-01-2024)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-03714970 , version 1

Citer

David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet. Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? *. 2022. ⟨halshs-03714970v1⟩
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