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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2016

Discontent with taxes and the timing of taxation : experimental evidence

Résumé

This paper reports results from a linear sanction cost variant of the power-to-take game, with implications for tax policies. We compare a pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) system with an ex-post taxation system in which payroll taxes are collected at the end of the fiscal year. Dissatisfaction with taxation, as proxied by the sanction in the power-to-take game, is significantly higher in an ex-post taxation system compared with the PAYE system. However, in anticipation of the higher sanction, the "tax authority" will not apply lower taxes in the former system. Communication does not decrease dissatisfaction in a significant manner, and it is not used extensively by participants.
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Dates et versions

hal-01282724 , version 1 (04-03-2016)
hal-01282724 , version 2 (11-10-2019)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01282724 , version 1

Citer

Radu Vranceanu, Angela Sutan, Delphine Dubart. Discontent with taxes and the timing of taxation : experimental evidence. 2016. ⟨hal-01282724v1⟩
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